

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION**

*In re Stanley Steemer International Data
Breach Litigation*

Case No. 2:23-cv-03932-SDM-EPD

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deaver

**MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS'
FEES, EXPENSES, AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARDS**

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement [Doc. No. 49-2]¹ preliminarily approved by the Court on January 27, 2025 [Doc. No. 51], Plaintiffs respectfully move for an order awarding (1) \$233,333.33 for attorney fees (one-third (1/3) of the \$700,000 non-reversionary common fund); (2) \$13,646.78 for reimbursement of Class Counsel's costs and expenses; and (3) Service Awards of \$4,000 for each Class Representative. As demonstrated herein, Class Counsel's attorneys' fees request is appropriate under the "percentage of the fund" method, which is the preferred approach for determining a reasonable fee in a common fund case such as this one. The requested fee percentage is approximately 33.33%, which is well within the range typically approved in the Sixth Circuit and is further supported by the discretionary lodestar cross-check analysis. Class Counsel's expenses are also reasonable under the circumstances and the request for \$4,000 Service Awards for each Plaintiff is an amount that is frequently approved by Courts within this District.

¹ All capitalized terms not defined herein have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the alleged compromise of personally identifiable information (“Personal Information”) as a result of a February 2023 cyberattack experienced by Stanley Steemer International, Inc. (“Stanley Steemer” or “Defendant”) that impacted over 63,000 individuals (the “Data Breach”). Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. (“CAC”), Doc. No. 27, ¶¶ 4, 54. In response to the Data Breach, Defendant sent a notice letter to each impacted individual providing a description of the type of Personal Information involved and explaining that the data was accessed from Stanley Steemer’s systems. *Id.*, ¶¶ 8–12 & Exs. A, C thereto. Plaintiffs received a notice letter dated November 15, 2023, from Defendant informing them about the Data Breach and that their Personal Information may have been compromised. *Id.* ¶¶ 8–12.

In response, on November 21, 2023, prior plaintiff Julia Kaled and Plaintiff Phillip Seabrook filed *Kaled et al. v. Stanley Steemer International, Inc.*, Case No.: 2:23-cv-03932-SDM. Doc. No. 1. Related complaints were later filed by former plaintiff Joey Mejia and Plaintiff Marc Huber, and on February 5, 2024, the Court entered an order consolidating the related actions. Doc. No. 14. On March 18, 2024, the Court entered an order appointing Raina C. Borrelli of Strauss Borrelli PLLC,² and Andrew J. Shamis of Shamis & Gentile, P.A. Doc. No. 19, ¶ 1.

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the CAC, asserting claims for Negligence (Count I), Breach of Implied Contract (Count II), Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count III), Breach of Confidence (Count IV), Invasion of Privacy (Count V), Unjust Enrichment/Quasi Contract (Count VI), Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Count VII), Violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act (Count VIII), Violation of the California Consumer Records Act (Count IX), and Declaratory Judgment (Count X). Doc. No. 27. After the CAC was filed, the Parties negotiated an ESI protocol

² Formerly known as Turke & Strauss LLP. *See* Doc. No. 19; Doc. No. 36.

and the terms of a protective order. Borrelli & Shamis Decl. ¶ 16. Once the Parties reached an agreement, they filed a Motion for Protective Order and ESI Protocol on June 13, 2024, which was granted on June 14, 2024. Doc. Nos. 37-39. On June 13, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, for Lack of Standing, and Failure to State a Claim, or Strike Class Allegations. Doc. No. 36. Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Strike on July 19, 2024. Doc. 42.

The Parties were able to resolve this matter before the Court ruled on Defendant's Motion. Doc. No. 45. The Settlement Agreement is the product of extensive arm's-length negotiations before Hon. Morton Denlow (Ret.) of JAMS on September 26, 2024. Borrelli & Shamis Decl. ¶¶ 16, 21. Before mediation, Defendant produced informal discovery, which allowed the parties to evaluate each side's respective position, including class size, number of impacted individuals with social security numbers, insurance coverage, and potential arbitration defenses. *Id.* ¶ 21. After both sides submitted detailed mediation briefs and the parties held a full-day mediation, the parties were ultimately able to resolve the case. *Id.* On December 19, 2024, Class Counsel filed an Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, which was subsequently approved on January 27, 2025. Doc. Nos. 49, 51. Class Counsel will continue to expend substantial time and effort overseeing settlement administration and claims, briefing the motion for final approval, attending the final approval hearing, and overseeing the distribution of settlement benefits to the Class. Borrelli & Shamis Decl. ¶ 17.

Under the terms of this Settlement, Defendant will pay \$700,000 to establish the non-reversionary Settlement Fund which shall be used to pay benefits to Class Members, settlement administration and class notice costs, attorneys' fees and expense reimbursement, and service awards as approved by the Court. This Settlement represents an excellent result for the Settlement

Class in this litigation and was obtained against a well-funded defense by Defendant, which was represented by a large defense firm (Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP) that is highly experienced in defending data breach actions. Employee Subclass Members will receive a \$100.00 pro rata cash payment; Customer Subclass Members will receive a \$50.00 pro rata cash payment; and all Class Members can receive compensation for out-of-pocket losses on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to a maximum of \$10,000.00. *Id.* ¶ 23.

Although Plaintiffs believe in the merits of their claims, this litigation was inherently risky and complex. Plaintiffs would face risks at each stage of litigation. Against these risks, it was through the hard-fought negotiations, and the skill and hard work of Class Counsel and the Class Plaintiffs, that the Settlement was achieved for the benefit of the Settlement Class.

Class Counsel zealously prosecuted Plaintiffs' claims, achieving the Settlement Agreement only after an extensive investigation and prolonged arm's length negotiations. Even after coming to an agreement on the central terms, Class Counsel worked for weeks to finalize the Settlement Agreement and associated exhibits pertaining to notice, preliminary approval, and final approval.

As compensation for the substantial benefit conferred upon the Settlement Class, Class Counsel respectfully move the Court for an award of attorneys' fees of \$233,333.33 and out-of-pocket expenses totaling \$13,646.78, to be paid from the non-reversionary Settlement Fund. This fee request represents one-third (33.33%) of the total \$700,000.00 common fund recovery. This request is contemplated by the Settlement Agreement, and Class Counsel apprised the Court of this request in its Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval (filed on December 19, 2024). S.A., ¶ 92; Doc. 49-2. This amount was also clearly delineated in the Long Form and Short Form Notice to the Settlement Class (attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibits 1 and 2 within

Doc. 49-2). To date, zero class members have objected to the Settlement, the attorneys' fees, expenses, and service awards, and none have opted-out. Borrelli & Shamis Decl., ¶ 20.

III. ATTORNEYS' FEES

A. Class Counsel's Attorneys' Fee Request is Fair and Reasonable

Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorizes a court to award "reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement." Through the Settlement Agreement, Defendant has agreed to pay Class Counsel attorneys' fees, expenses, and Service Awards. S.A., ¶¶ 90, 92. Defendant agreed to pay attorneys' fees "not to exceed one-third of the Settlement Fund, or Two Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars and Thirty-Three Cents (\$233,333.33), plus reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses not to exceed Twenty Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents (\$20,000.00)." *Id.* ¶ 95.

"When awarding attorney's fees in a class action, a court must make sure that counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results achieved." *Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc.*, 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit "require[s] only that awards of attorneys' fees in common fund cases be reasonable under the circumstances." *Id.* at 516. "District courts apply a two-part analysis to assess the reasonableness of an attorney fee petition." *O'Donnell v. Fin. Am. Life Ins. Co.*, No. 2:14-cv-1071, 2018 WL 11357092, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2018). "First, the court must determine the appropriate method to calculate the fees, using either the percentage of fund or the Lodestar approach." *Id.* "Second, the Court must consider six factors to assess the reasonableness of the fee." *Id.* (citing *Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 581 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 2009)). The Court should provide a concise and clear explanation of the reasoning for adopting a particular method and the factors considered to arrive at the fee.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); *Rawlings*, 9 F.3d at 516. Here, Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees is appropriately assessed using the percentage of the fund analysis.

B. Class Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fee Request is Fair and Reasonable Under a Common Fund Analysis

Courts have “the historic power of equity” to permit a party recovering a fund for the benefit of others to recover his costs, including his attorney fees, from the fund itself or from the other parties enjoying the benefit. *Alyeska Pipeline SVC Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y*, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). Indeed, “a litigant or lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). This is known as the “common fund doctrine” and it is premised upon the principle “that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its costs are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.” *Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc.*, 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1277 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (citing *Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank*, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939)); *Boeing*, 444 U.S. at 478).

“Counsel who creates a common fund for the benefit of a class is entitled to a payment of fees and expenses from the fund relative to the benefit achieved.” *Harsh v. Kalida Mfg., Inc.*, No. 3:18-CV-2239, 2021 WL 4145720, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2021); *Connectivity Sys. Inc. v. Nat’l City Bank*, No. 2:08-CV-1119, 2011 WL 292008, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2011) (because “counsel’s efforts create a substantial common fund for the benefit of the class, they are, therefore, entitled to payment from the fund based on a percentage of that fund”); *see also New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc.*, 234 F.R.D. 627, 633 (W.D. Ky. 2006); *Brotherton v. Cleveland*, 141 F. Supp. 2d 894, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2001). Pursuant to the terms of this Settlement, Defendant will create a \$700,000 non-reversionary common fund for the benefit of the Class.

In the Sixth Circuit, the “percentage of the fund has been the preferred method for common fund cases, where there is a single pool of money and each class member is entitled to a share.” *Lott v. Louisville Metro Gov't*, No. 3:19-CV-271-RGJ, 2023 WL 2562407, at *3 n.4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2023) (quotation omitted); *Robles v. Comtrak Logistics, Inc.*, No. 15-CV-2228, 2022 WL 17672639, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2022) (“The percentage-of-the-fund method, however, tends to be favored over the lodestar approach by courts in this circuit.”); *Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co.*, 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 789 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“percentage of the fund has been the preferred method for common fund cases”); *Sweetwater Valley Farm, Inc. v. Dean Foods Co. (In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig.)*, No. 2:07-CV 208, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131855 at *13 (E.D. Tenn. July 11, 2018) (“[T]he percentage-of-the-fund method, however, clearly appears to have become the preferred method in common fund cases.”).

In the Sixth Circuit, attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to the percentage of the fund method “typically range from 20 to 50 percent of the common fund.” *Lott*, 2023 WL 2562407, at *3; *Connectivity Sys. Inc.*, 2011 WL 292008, at *12 (same); *Brotherton*, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (same).³ Here, Plaintiffs request an award of attorneys’ fees equal to one-third (1/3) of the common fund created, well within the typical range. *See, e.g., Hunter v. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc.*, No. 2:19-CV-00411, 2023 WL 3204684, at *8 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2023) (“When using the percentage-of-the-fund method, courts in the Sixth Circuit generally approve of awards that are one-third (1/3) of the total settlement.”); *Zilinsky v. LeafFilter N., LLC*, No. 2:20-CV-6229, 2023 WL 2696554, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2023) (awarding attorneys’ fees of “one-third of the total Settlement

³ *See also In re Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc.*, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“the range of reasonableness ... has been designated as between twenty to fifty percent of the common fund”); *In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility*, 173 F.R.D. 205, 217 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“[t]ypically, the percentage awarded ranges from 20 to 50 percent of the common fund”), *rev'd on other grounds*, 24 F. App'x 520 (6th Cir. 2001).

Fund”); *Hargrove v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. Of Educ.*, 2022 WL 188190, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2022) (finding that a 40% fee is “hardly the ‘windfall’ that courts should be wary of when assessing the reasonableness of such fees”); *In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig.*, No. 12-md-02311, 2022 WL 4385345, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2022) (a fee request of 1/3 of the class action settlement fund “is within the range of fee awards made by courts in this Circuit”); *Walker v. Nautilus, Inc.*, No. 2:20-cv-3414-EAS (S.D. Ohio June 27, 2022) (awarding attorneys’ fees of 1/3 of the \$4.25 million common fund); *Love v. Gannett Co.*, No. 3:19-cv-296, 2021 WL 4352800, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 24, 2021) (approving 33.85% of fund as reasonable attorneys’ fees); *Dillworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc.*, No. 5:08-CV-1694, 2010 WL 776933, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2010) (approving fee equal to 33% of settlement fund).

Courts in this Circuit have recently granted attorneys’ fees of one-third of the common fund in similar data breach class action cases. *Migliaccio v. Parker Hannifin, Corp.*, No. 1:22-cv-835-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2023; Doc. 42, ¶ 7) (\$583,333.33 fee award from a \$1,750,000 common fund in a data breach class action settlement); *Tucker v. Marietta Area Health Care Inc.*, No. 2:22-cv-184-SDM (S.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2023; Doc. 38, ¶ 7) (same); *Phelps v. Toyotetsu N. Am.*, No. 6:22-cv-106 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2023; Doc. 47, PageID # 542) (granting attorneys’ fees of one-third of the common fund in a data breach class action settlement).

The Sixth Circuit has adopted the following factors (often referred to as the *Ramey* factors) to consider when determining what constitutes a reasonable fee in a common fund case:

- 1) the value of the benefit rendered to the plaintiff class (i.e., the results achieved);
- 2) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others;
- 3) whether the services were undertaken on a contingent fee basis;

- 4) the value of the services on an hourly basis (the lodestar cross-check);
- 5) the complexity of the litigation; and
- 6) the professional skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides.⁴

Each factor supports Class Counsel's fee request here.

1. The Results Achieved in this Litigation

The first *Ramey* factor requires the Court to evaluate the benefit of the settlement to the Class and is often cited as the most important factor. *Bowling*, 922 F. Supp. at 1280. The Settlement has a total value of \$700,000 and provides a range of valuable benefits for the Class Members: Employee Subclass Members will receive a \$100.00 pro rata cash payment; Customer Subclass Members will receive a \$50.00 pro rata cash payment; and all Class Members can receive compensation for out-of-pocket losses on a dollar-for-dollar basis up to a maximum of \$10,000.00. S.A. ¶¶ 29, 53, 56–57, 65.⁵

Furthermore, the theoretical recovery per Class Member in this case of roughly \$11.11 per person (\$700,000 for 63,000 Class Members) exceeds the amount recovered in other similar data breach class action settlements. *Borrelli & Shamis Decl.*, ¶ 24 (noting several recent data breach class action settlements also involving Social Security numbers that settled for less per Class Member). This indicates that the \$700,000 Settlement Fund is a strong recovery for the Class. *Id.* Defendant has denied liability and has consistently maintained that the Plaintiffs' allegations lack merit. *See generally* Doc. No. 36, Def. Mot. While the Plaintiffs are confident in their claims,

⁴ *Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank*, No. 1:11-CV-88, 2014 WL 3447947, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2014) (citing *Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc.*, 508 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975)).

⁵ The Agreement provides for a larger pro rata cash payment to the Employee Subclass because the Data Breach revealed more sensitive information as to the Employee Subclass (for example, social security numbers, health insurance information, medical information) than as to the Customer Subclass. *Borrelli & Shamis Decl.*, ¶ 22.

Defendant could appeal a favorable judgment in the absence of settlement which would delay or even nullify any benefit to members of the Class.

Given the risk of proceeding, the value obtained from bringing, prosecuting, persevering, and settling this litigation should not be underestimated. Moreover, in addition to the inherent risk as to the outcome, achieving a result that resolves this litigation *now* is valuable in that it avoids the certain delay of continuing litigation with the possibility of appeals. Any delay in the process could be of great detriment to the Class. *See Connectivity Sys. Inc.*, 2011 WL 292008, at *4 (“Given the time value of money, a future recovery, even one greater than the proposed Settlement Amount, may be less valuable to the Settlement Class than receiving the benefits of the Settlement Agreement now.”). The results achieved here are substantial and timely, and support Class Counsel’s fee request.

2. The Requested Fee Provides Adequate Incentive to Undertake this Representation for the Benefit of Others

Awarding Class Counsel the requested attorneys’ fee amount provides an incentive for qualified and experienced attorneys to undertake this type of speculative and risky litigation. Thus, “class counsel’s expenditure of time and money benefitted small claimants who lack the resources to prosecute a case of this nature.” *Hainey v. Parrott*, No. 1:02-CV-733, 2007 WL 3308027, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2007). Without counsel willing to take the risk of challenging companies like Stanley Steemer, Plaintiffs would have been left with no recourse since the cost to pursue their individual claims far exceeded their damages. *Myers v. Mem’l Health Sys. Marietta Mem’l Hosp.*, No. 15-CV-2956, 2022 WL 4079559, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2022) (“Society has a stake in rewarding attorneys who achieve a result that the individual class members probably could not obtain on their own.” (quoting *Kritzer v. Safelite Sols., LLC*, No. 2:10-cv-0729, 2012 WL 1945144, at *9 (S.D. Ohio May 30, 2012))); *Karpik v. Huntington Bancshares Inc.*, No. 2:17-cv-1153, 2021

WL 757123, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2021) (“Without a class action, the individual plaintiffs would not have had a strong incentive to pursue recovery because any monetary award would have been severely outweighed by the costs to litigate their cases.”). This second factor also supports the requested attorneys’ fee award.

3. Class Counsel Undertook this Representation on a Contingent Basis

The third *Ramey* factor “stands as a proxy for the risk that attorneys will not recover compensation for the work they put into a case.” *In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 765 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (citing *Bowling*, 922 F. Supp. at 1282). Some courts consider the risk of non-recovery to be the most important factor in the fee determination. *Id.* (citing cases). “[C]ontingency fee arrangements indicate that there is a certain degree of risk in obtaining a recovery.” *Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC*, No. 3:10-cv-00562, 2015 WL 9413142, at * 9 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2015) (quoting *In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.*, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1043).

Class Counsel agreed to undertake this litigation on a contingent basis. Borrelli & Shamis Decl., ¶¶ 3, 14. Class Counsel took a considerable risk here in advancing all costs (which presently totals \$13,646.78), while receiving no compensation for the work they have performed from November 2023 to present. *Id.*, ¶ 14. Moreover, had there been no recovery, Class Counsel would not have been paid a fee or reimbursement for their expenses. *Id.* Therefore, this factor weighs in support of Class Counsel’s fee request.

4. The Value of the Services Supports the Fee Requested

Although performing a cross-check on the percentage method using Class Counsel’s lodestar is optional and solely within the Court’s discretion, *Van Horn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 436 Fed. App’x 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2011), courts may perform a lodestar cross-check to ensure counsel does not receive a windfall. *Love*, 2021 WL 4352800, at *6; *see also In re Cardinal*

Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d at 764. The purpose of the exercise is “not to supplant the court’s detailed inquiry into the attorney’s skill and efficiency in recovering the settlement” using the percentage of the fund and *Ramey* factors, but instead merely to ensure that the fee award is still “roughly aligned with the amount of work the attorneys contributed.” *Id.*

“The Court performs a lodestar cross-check by comparing the lodestar multiplier used in this case to lodestar multipliers used in similar cases.” *Id.* at 767. “In contrast to employing the lodestar method in full, when using a lodestar cross-check, ‘the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the district court.’” *Id.* (quoting *In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The Sixth Circuit has instructed that when “determining fee awards, courts should not ‘become green-eyeshade accountants,’ but instead must content themselves with ‘rough justice.’” *Waters v. Pizza to You, LLC*, No. 3:19-cv-372, 2022 WL 3048376, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2022) (quoting *Rembert v. A Plus Home Health Care Agency LLC*, 986 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal punctuation altered)); *see also In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 396 F.3d 294, 306 n.16 (3d Cir. Pa. 2005) (“the lodestar cross-check is ‘not a full-blown lodestar inquiry’ and a court ‘should be satisfied with a summary of the hours expended by all counsel at various stages with less detailed breakdown than would be required in a lodestar jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F.R.D. 340, 423 (2002)).⁶

From November 2023 through the present, Class Counsel and their co-counsel have spent

⁶ *Accord* The Manual For Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 14.122 (2004) (“the lodestar is at least useful as a cross-check . . . using affidavits and other information provided by the fee applicant”); *Milliron v. T-Mobile United States*, 423 F. App’x 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the crosscheck is not the primary analysis in this type of case and does not entail ‘mathematical precision []or bean-counting,’”); *In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. Sec. Litig.*, 643 F. Supp. 148, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (“Counsel have provided the Court with helpful charts summarizing the hours logged and the rate requested by each of the attorneys involved in this case.”).

more than 394 hours prosecuting this litigation. Borrelli & Shamis Decl., ¶ 16. *See also Exhibit C*, attached thereto. Class Counsel will necessarily spend substantial additional time from this point to conclusion of the case, time that will not be reflected in this fee application. Class Counsel and their co-counsel's current lodestar is \$261,587.50. *Id.* ¶ 17. The hourly rates that form the basis of the lodestar calculation reflect the experience of Class Counsel and have been previously approved by other courts. *Id.* Class Counsel sought to efficiently pursue this matter on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class without duplicating work. *Id.* The requested \$233,333.33 fee is one-third (1/3) of the value of the \$700,000 Settlement Fund, and less than Class Counsel and their co-counsel's current lodestar. Thus, when cross-checked, the requested fee is equivalent to the application of a current multiplier of 0.89 (i.e., $233,333.33 / 261,587.50$). Class Counsel further predicts that by the time this matter is concluded, the lodestar multiplier will be closer to 0.80 (4/5 of the lodestar). *Id.* ¶ 17.

Class counsel seek less than the lodestar. "Because of the inherent risks of litigation, courts in this district award multipliers of 'between approximately 2.0 and 5.0.'" *Karpik*, 2021 WL 757123, at *8 (citing *In re Broadwing, Inc. ERISA Litg.*, 252 F.R.D. 369, 381 (S.D. Ohio 2016)). The modest 0.89 multiplier falls well within the reasonable range. *See Dillow v. Home Care Network, Inc.*, No. 1:16-cv-612, 2018 WL 4776977, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2018) (citing *Lowther v. AK Steel Corp.*, No. 1:11-cv-877, 2012 WL 6676131, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2012) (approving 3.06 multiplier and citing cases with multipliers ranging from 4.3 to 8.5)); *In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (approving multiplier of 5.9); *Myers*, 2022 WL 4079559, at *6 ("Awards of common-fund attorney fees in amounts two to three-times greater than the lodestar have been found reasonable"); *Rudi v. Wexner*, 2022 WL 1682297, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2022) ("2.75 multiplier falls a the low end of that reasonable range").

In sum, Class Counsel's fee request is reasonable based on a percentage of the common

fund, and on the discretionary lodestar cross-check.

5. The Complexity of the Litigation Supports the Requested Fee

The fifth *Ramey* factor requires the Court to consider the complexity of the case. Although nearly all class actions involve a high level of risk, expense, and complexity, this is a particularly complex class action in an especially risky area. Historically, data breach cases have faced substantial hurdles in making it past the pleading stage. *See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 3341200, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2010) (approving a data breach settlement in part because “proceeding through the litigation process in this case is unlikely to produce the plaintiffs’ desired results”); *Hashemi v. Bosley, Inc.*, No. CV 21-946 PSG (RAOX), 2022 WL 18278431, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2022) (noting the challenges in litigating data breach cases meant that “Plaintiffs would have faced prolonged litigation and significant obstacles as trial approached”); *Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, No. 3:15-cv-01175, 2015 WL 6123054, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015) (holding that the risk that plaintiff’s identity could be stolen was insufficient to confer standing based on a data breach exposing plaintiff’s name and driver’s license number); *Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp.*, No. 08 Civ. 6060 (RMB), 2010 WL 2643307, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (collecting cases and noting that “every court to [analyze data breach cases] has ultimately dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . or under Rule 56 following the submission of a motion for summary judgment”).

Success at class certification has also been very limited in these cases.⁷ Even if this Court

⁷ *See Adkins v. Facebook, Inc.*, 424 F. Supp. 3d 686, 691 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019) (granting motion to certify injunctive-only class, but denying motion to certify damages and issues classes in data breach class action); *Cheryl Gaston v. FabFitFun, Inc.*, No. 2:20-CV-09534-RGK-E, 2021 WL 6496734, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021) (“data breach cases have experienced minimal success in moving for class certification”); *In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 293 F.R.D. 21 (D. Me. 2013) (denying class certification in data breach action); *In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig.*, 246 F.R.D. 389 (D. Mass. 2007) (same). *Cf. In re Brinker Data Incident Litig.*, No. 3:18-cv-686-TJC-MCR, 2021 WL 1405508, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2021) (“The

were to certify a contested class, the inherent risks attendant to trying a data breach class action would only magnify the difficult legal questions at issue here. *See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.*, No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2018 WL 3960068, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2018) (“class certification was not guaranteed, in part because Plaintiffs had a scarcity of precedent to draw on”). Although Plaintiffs believe they would ultimately prevail in such a trial, a verdict for the defense would be entirely possible. To the extent the law has gradually accepted this relatively new type of litigation, the path to a class-wide monetary judgment remains unforged, particularly in the area of damages. Data breach cases are among the riskiest and uncertain of all class action litigation, making settlement the more prudent course when a reasonable deal is available.

Because data breach litigation is particularly risky and complex, this factor weighs in favor of approval. While Class Counsel remain confident in Plaintiffs’ claims, there is a recognized element of risk in any litigation, particularly complex and expensive data breach class litigation. *See In re Omnivision Techs.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“The risk that further litigation might result in plaintiffs not recovering at all, particularly a case involving complicated legal issues, is a significant factor in the award of fees”).

6. The Professional Skill of Counsel Supports the Requested Fee

The last *Ramey* factor addresses the professional skill of counsel. Here, Class Counsel has substantial experience representing plaintiffs in data breach class actions. Class Counsel devote a substantial percentage of their practices to data breach and privacy litigation, and are frequently appointed as class counsel in data privacy cases across the country. Borrelli & Shamis Decl., ¶¶ 4-12. *See also Exhibits A and B*, attached thereto. Defendant has likewise been represented by counsel who specialize in defending data breach cases from Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani,

Court acknowledges it may be the first to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class involving individual consumers complaining of a data breach involving payment cards....”).

LLP. Class Counsel's professionalism, experience, and skill support the requested fee.

7. The Fee Request is Supported by the Class Representatives

The utilization of the common fund doctrine as a basis for the payment of attorneys' fees and expenses is employed in addition to, and independent of, the contingent fee contract between lawyer and client. Bolstering the foregoing common fund considerations, the Plaintiffs support the payment of fees and expenses as requested in the instant motion. *Id.* ¶ 26.

Based upon the foregoing, a fee of \$233,333.33 representing one-third (1/3) of \$700,000 common fund is fair and reasonable, is within the range established in the Sixth and other Circuits and is within the range established by federal courts in Ohio.

IV. CLASS COUNSEL'S EXPENSES

"Under the common fund doctrine, class counsel is entitled to reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses and costs in the prosecution of claims, and in obtaining settlement, including but not limited to expenses incurred in connection with document productions, consulting with and deposing experts, travel and other litigation-related expenses." *Karpik*, 2021 WL 757123, at *9 (quoting *In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.*, 218 F.R.D. 508, 534-35 (E.D. Mich. 2003)). "[T]he categories of expenses for which Plaintiffs' counsel seek reimbursement are the type routinely charged to hourly fee-paying clients and thus should be reimbursed out of the settlement fund ... [including] the cost of experts and consultants ... computerized research; travel and lodging expenses; photocopying cost; filing and witness fees; postage and overnight delivery; and the cost of court reporters and depositions." *Fruit of the Loom*, 234 F.R.D. at 635 (approving expenses submitted pursuant to these categories).

The Settlement Agreement states that Class Counsel's expenses will be capped at \$20,000.00. Class Counsel has incurred \$13,646.78 in costs and expenses. Borrelli & Shamis Decl.,

¶¶ 13, 18. As set forth in the Class Counsel’s Declaration, each expense for which Class Counsel seeks reimbursement was necessary and directly related to this litigation. *Id.* See also **Exhibit C**, attached thereto. Accordingly, Class Counsel is entitled to this expense reimbursement.

V. SERVICE AWARDS

The Settlement Agreement also provides that Class Counsel will apply to the Court for Service Awards in the amount of \$4,000.00 to each Plaintiff. S.A., ¶ 90. Class Counsel moves for the approval of the Service Awards under principles of equity and the prior practice and case law in the district courts within the Sixth Circuit. Furthermore, the Class Representative Service Awards here are less than what has been approved in other common fund data breach class action settlements. *See, e.g.*, Jackson v. Nationwide Retirement Solutions, Inc., No. 2:22-cv-3499, 2024 WL 958726, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2024) (\$5,000 service awards to each class representative); *Marietta Area Health Care*, No. 2:22-cv-184-SDM (S.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2023) (same); *Lutz v. Electromed, Inc.*, No. 0:21-cv-02198 (D. Minn.; Doc. 73) (approving \$9,900 service award); *Bert v. AK Steel Corp.*, No. 1:02-CV-467, 2008 WL 4693747, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2008) (approving \$10,000 incentive award to each class representative).⁸

“Service awards are efficacious ways of encouraging members of a class to become class representatives and rewarding individual efforts taken on behalf of the class.” *Rudi*, 2022 WL 1682297, at *5 (quoting *Hadix v. Johnson*, 322 F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003)). “[C]ourts routinely approve incentive awards to compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provided and the risks they incurred during the course of the class action litigation.” *Dilworth v. Case Farms Processing, Inc.*, No. 5:08-cv-1694, 2010 WL 776933, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2010) (internal

⁸ See also *Birr v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.*, No. 1:08CV124, 2011 WL 1429171, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2011) (adopting magistrate’s Report and Recommendation approving incentive payment to the Class Representative of \$5,000).

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Through their inclusion in the Consolidated Class Action Complaint, the Plaintiffs indicated their desire and willingness to undertake the responsibilities and fiduciary duties on behalf of the class. This is a voluntary obligation that goes well beyond the pursuit of their individual claims. Plaintiffs remained in close contact with Class Counsel, prior to the case filing and throughout the litigation; they also reviewed the Complaint and other court filings and approved the Settlement. Borrelli & Shamis Decl., ¶¶ 25-26. Without their willingness to undertake these obligations on behalf of the Class Members, the recovery in this case would not have occurred. Accordingly, a Service Award of \$4,000.00 to each Plaintiff for their time and work on this case on behalf of all Class Members is appropriate.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court approve the payment from the \$700,000.00 common fund of (1) \$233,333.33 for reasonable attorneys' fees; (2) \$13,646.78 for reimbursement of Class Counsel's reasonable expenses; and (3) \$4,000 for each Plaintiff as a Service Award, as well as any further relief that this Court deems just and equitable.

Dated: March 28, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Raina C. Borrelli
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Raina C. Borrelli, hereby certify that on March 28, 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to counsel of record, below, via the ECF system.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2025.

STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC

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